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AN ARGUMENT FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXECUTION
IMPACT EVIDENCE IN PENNSYLVANIA
Paige H. Forster*
I.  INTRODUCTION
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court made a significant change to
sentencing proceedings during capital trials.1  The Court ruled in Payne v.
Tennessee that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit “victim impact
evidence,” testimony about the character of the murder victim and the impact
of the death on the victim’s family.2  The Payne decision permits highly
emotional testimony from family members3 to enter into the penalty phase of
a death penalty trial.4
During the penalty phase, the sentencer (usually a jury) has already found
the defendant guilty of first-degree murder and is considering whether the
sentence should be death or life in prison.5  This determination is made by
weighing mitigating circumstances against aggravating circumstances relating
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6. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (West 1998).
7. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d) (West 1998).
8. Payne, 501 U.S. at 826-27.
9. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9711(e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(4) (West 1998).
10. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e)(8) (West 1998).
11. Payne, 501 U.S. at 822.
12. Id.
13. Logan, supra note 3, at 4-5.
14. Id. at 5.
15. Blume, supra note 1, at 268.
16. Id.
to the crime or the defendant’s prior history.6  In Pennsylvania, aggravating
circumstances are limited to those enumerated in the capital sentencing
statute, such as killing a police officer, killing during the commission of a
felony, or killing by means of torture.7  To counter the aggravating evidence,
the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant has the “broadest latitude”
to present mitigating evidence to the jury.8  The Pennsylvania statute
accordingly allows defendants to show any one of a list of mitigating
circumstances (e.g., no significant criminal history, extreme mental or
emotional disturbance, relative youth)9 or “[a]ny other evidence of mitigation
concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances
of his offense.”10
The majority opinion in Payne stated that admitting Victim Impact
Evidence was a way to redress the imbalance in capital trials, which had
become “unfairly weighted” in favor of the defendant.11  The decision allows
the prosecution to present a broader range of evidence at the penalty phase,
which, the Court said, is only fair since “virtually no limits are placed on the
relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce.”12
Defense attorneys have attempted to respond to Victim Impact Evidence
by presenting “execution impact evidence,”13 which consists of information
about how the convicted individual’s death by execution would affect his or
her family.14
The states that use the death penalty have responded fairly consistently
to the Payne ruling.15  A recent survey found that of the thirty-eight death
penalty states, thirty-one permit the use of Victim Impact Evidence in a fairly
broad fashion, two place significant restrictions on the use of Victim Impact
Evidence, and five have yet to consider its admissibility.16
By contrast, there is no clear consensus among state courts on the
question of Execution Impact Evidence.  In most of the death penalty states,
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17. Logan, supra note 3, at 32-33.
18. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(2) (West 1998).
19. Commonwealth v. Harris, 817 A.2d 1033 (Pa. 2002).
20. S. 179-22, 1st. Spec. Sess., at 123-24 (Pa. 1995).
21. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(2) (West 1982) (amended 1995).
Execution Impact Evidence is not admissible, although it is permitted in at
least seven states.17
Pennsylvania follows the majority of states with regard to its law on
Victim Impact Evidence and Execution Impact Evidence.  Victim Impact
Evidence is specifically authorized through language in the Pennsylvania
capital sentencing statute.18  Execution Impact Evidence, on the other hand,
was ruled inadmissible by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2002 because
it is “irrelevant” to the questions at issue during the sentencing phase.19
This Note will argue that, since Pennsylvania permits Victim Impact
Evidence, fairness requires that Execution Impact Evidence be permitted as
well.  Part II reviews Pennsylvania’s approval of Victim Impact Evidence and
its prohibition of Execution Impact Evidence.  Part III outlines the ways in
which both kinds of evidence can be seen as highly problematic.  Part IV
argues that the U.S. Constitution requires that Execution Impact Evidence be
admitted, despite its potentially troubling nature, to show all possible
mitigating circumstances.  Part V concludes by emphasizing the need for
balance between Victim and Execution Impact Evidence.
II.  PENNSYLVANIA LAW ON IMPACT EVIDENCE
A.  Victim Impact Evidence
In 1995, the Pennsylvania General Assembly amended the state’s
sentencing statute to explicitly permit Victim Impact Evidence.20  Prior to the
amendment, the statute read:  “In the sentencing hearing, evidence may be
presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant and admissible on the
question of the sentence to be imposed.  Evidence shall include matters
relating to any . . . aggravating or mitigating circumstances . . . .”21  After the
1995 amendment, the statute reads:
In the sentencing hearing, evidence concerning the victim and the impact that the death
of the victim has had on the family of the victim is admissible.  Additionally, evidence
may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant and admissible on the
question of the sentence to be imposed.  Evidence shall include matters relating to any
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22. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(2) (West 1998) (emphasis added).
23. Pa. S. Res. 123.
24. Commonwealth v. Means, 773 A.2d 143, 151 (Pa. 2001).
25. Id. at 153.
26. Id. at 157.  Means’ precedential value was later questioned since the statute was upheld by a
plurality of three justices plus one concurring justice.  However, the court has confirmed that Means is
sound precedent.  Commonwealth v. Rice, 795 A.2d 340, 351 (Pa. 2002).
27. The court held explicitly in Means that “victim impact testimony is just one of the relevant
factors the jury may consider.”  Means, 773 A.2d at 154.  Although the court has held that Execution
Impact Evidence is irrelevant, Commonwealth v. Harris, 817 A.2d 1033, 1054 (Pa. 2002), other states’
courts have taken the opposite view.  See, e.g., State v. Manning, No. 03-1982, 2004 La. LEXIS 2981, at
*128 (La. Oct. 19, 2004).  In addition, commentators have advanced coherent arguments for the relevance
of Execution Impact Evidence.  See discussion infra Part IV.
28. Harris, 817 A.2d at 1053-54.
29. Id. at 1053.  The “catchall” provision permits “[a]ny other evidence of mitigation concerning
the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense.”  42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 9711(e)(8) (West 1998).
. . . aggravating or mitigating circumstances . . . , and information concerning the victim
and the impact that the death of the victim has had on the family of the victim.22
On the Pennsylvania Senate floor, one of the senators who sponsored the
bill explained that the amendment would “codify the United States Supreme
Court’s . . . decision in Paine [sic] v. Tennessee that the use of victim impact
evidence at the sentencing portion of a criminal trial, particularly for a
defendant convicted of first-degree murder, is constitutionally permissible.”23
In Commonwealth v. Means, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed
the constitutionality of the amended statute under the federal24 and state
constitutions.25  The court held that “Pennsylvania jurisprudence favors the
introduction of all relevant evidence during a capital sentencing proceeding.
Pennsylvania’s sentencing scheme does not limit the evidence admissible in
the penalty phase to only the information necessary to establish aggravating
and mitigating circumstances.”26
B.  Execution Impact Evidence
The Means ruling might appear to allow both Victim Impact Evidence
and Execution Impact Evidence, as both are arguably relevant.27  However,
one year later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v.
Harris that Execution Impact Evidence is inadmissible.28
In Harris, the defendant’s family testified during the penalty trial about
the defendant’s “character and his difficult upbringing,” which was relevant
under the sentencing statute’s “catchall” mitigating factor.29  In addition, the
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30. Harris, 817 A.2d at 1053-54.
31. Id. at 1054.
32. Means, 773 A.2d at 153.
33. Harris, 817 A.2d at 1059 (Zappala, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
34. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 865 A.2d 761, 798 (Pa. 2004).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. The defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty is determined by the presence of aggravating
factors, such as the victim’s status as a firefighter or law enforcement official, the commission of murder
for pay or by means of torture, or the defendant’s “significant history of felony convictions involving the
defendant sought to admit his family’s testimony about the effect of his crime
on their lives, but the trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s objection on
grounds of irrelevance.30  The Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s ruling,
stating that the defendant’s “‘execution impact’ or ‘third party impact’
testimony . . . was not relevant under Pennsylvania’s capital sentencing
statute,” since it “does not fall within any of the seven specific mitigating
circumstances” or the “catchall” mitigating circumstance.31
Notably, the Harris majority did not directly address the expansive
language in Means regarding the types of evidence that are admissible in the
sentencing phase.32  In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Zappala
stated that despite his dissent in Means, he believed that the Means majority
opinion signified that both Victim Impact Evidence and Execution Impact
Evidence were admissible.33
In 2004, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Hughes
took a further step foreclosing the admissibility of Execution Impact
Evidence.34  The court limited the Means language that Justice Zappala had
cited in Harris.35  The Hughes court acknowledged that Means stated that
relevant evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital trial “was not
limited to aggravating and mitigating circumstances,” but added that “this
pronouncement was in relation to the ability of the Commonwealth to
introduce victim impact testimony pursuant to a specific statutory
authorization.”36  Therefore, the Hughes court read Means to signify that
“[t]he precedent in this area has . . . circumscribed admissibility to evidence
that tends to establish or rebut statutory eligibility or selection criteria,
namely, aggravating or mitigating circumstances and victim impact
evidence.”37  In other words, to be relevant at the sentencing phase, evidence
does not have to fall into the categories of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances; but it must fall into one of the categories of eligibility or
selection criteria that are listed in the statute.38
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use or threat of violence.”  42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d) (West 1998).  Once eligibility is
determined, the selection decision is made as specified in the statute:  “[T]he verdict must be a sentence
of death if the jury unanimously finds . . . one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any
mitigating circumstances.”  42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (West 1998).
39. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(2) (West 1998).
40. Hughes, 865 A.2d at 798 n.41.
41. Id.
42. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(2) (West 1998).
43. Commonwealth v. Harris, 817 A.2d 1033, 1054 (Pa. 2002).
44. See, e.g., Blume, supra note 1; Logan, supra note 3; Evan J. Mandery, Notions of Symmetry and
Self in Death Penalty Jurisprudence (With Implications for the Admissibility of Victim Impact Evidence),
15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 471 (2004); Amy K. Phillips, Comment, Thou Shalt Not Kill Any Nice People:
The Problem of Victim Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35 AM. CRIM . L. REV. 93 (1998).
45. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 845-47 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Commonwealth v. Means, 773 A.2d 143, 160-62 (Pa. 2001) (Zappala, J., dissenting); Rachel King &
Katherine Norgard, What About Our Families?  Using the Impact on Death Row Defendants’ Family
Members as a Mitigating Factor in Death Penalty Sentencing Hearings, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1119
(1999); Logan, supra note 3.
The portion of the statute that outlines the required jury instructions states
that if there is at least one aggravating circumstance, the jury “shall consider,
in weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, any [victim impact]
evidence.”39  The Hughes opinion reiterates this point, stating that Victim
Impact Evidence is part of the selection decision, together with aggravating
and mitigating circumstances.40  In Hughes, the court laid out an exhaustive
list of the types of evidence that are admissible at the sentencing phase of a
capital trial.41  By leaving out Execution Impact Evidence, the court stated
implicitly—but clearly—that it is not admissible.
Thus, the penalty phase of a capital trial in Pennsylvania is explicitly
permitted to include Victim Impact Evidence,42 but it may not include
Execution Impact Evidence.43
III.  THE PROBLEMS OF VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE AND EXECUTION IMPACT
EVIDENCE
No consideration of Victim Impact Evidence and Execution Impact
Evidence could reasonably omit discussion of the problematic nature of both
types of evidence.  Certainly, Victim Impact Evidence has been thoroughly
critiqued in judicial opinions and in the academic literature.44  Execution
Impact Evidence has received less attention, and less of what has been written
about it considers the problems that attend its use.45  This section will outline
and briefly respond to the criticisms of Victim Impact Evidence, then discuss
a few of the problems with Execution Impact Evidence.
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46. Payne, 501 U.S. at 847 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496,
507 (1987)).
47. Id. at 846 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering—A Personal Reflection and a Victim-Centered Critique,
20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 21, 48-49 (1992).
49. Payne, 501 U.S. at 823.
50. Blume, supra note 1, at 279.
A.  Criticism of Victim Impact Evidence
Criticisms of Victim Impact Evidence can be roughly divided into two
categories:  substantive and procedural.
1.  Substantive Concerns
Foremost among the concerns about Victim Impact Evidence is one
articulated by Justice Marshall in his Payne dissent: the evidence is
problematic precisely because of its focus on the victim and the victim’s
family.  At the sentencing phase, the jury’s “constitutionally required task [is
to] determin[e] whether the death penalty is appropriate in light of the
background and record of the accused and the particular circumstances of the
crime.”46  Victim Impact Evidence instead “draw[s] the jury’s attention . . . to
such illicit considerations as the eloquence with which family members
express their grief and the status of the victim in the community.”47
Closely related to this substantive objection to Victim Impact Evidence
is the concern that it leads irresistibly toward relative valuations of human life
that are morally objectionable,48 not to mention irrelevant to the capital
sentencing procedure.  The Payne majority dismissed this possibility, stating:
As a general matter, . . . victim impact evidence is not offered to encourage comparative
judgments . . .—for instance, that the killer of a hardworking, devoted parent deserves
the death penalty, but that the murderer of a reprobate does not.  It is designed to show
instead each victim’s “uniqueness as an individual human being . . . .”49
Nevertheless, as one commentator has noted, the implicit message of
Victim Impact Evidence may be strong:
What else could a capital sentencing jury think when presented with detailed evidence
about both the defendant and the victim other than that its role is to decide whether the
capital defendant . . . should be permitted to live when the innocent victim and his or her
family have suffered so much?50
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51. Payne, 501 U.S. at 823; Logan, supra note 3, at 27.
52. Logan, supra note 3, at 27.
53. Payne, 501 U.S. at 823.
54. Logan, supra note 3, at 27 n.138.
55. See, e.g., Payne, 501 U.S. at 814-16 (summarizing Victim Impact Evidence presented at Pervis
Tyrone Payne’s trial); Commonwealth v. Natividad, 773 A.2d 167, 178-79 (Pa. 2001) (summarizing Victim
Impact Evidence presented at Ricardo Natividad’s trial).
56. Blume, supra note 1, at 271-72 (citations omitted).
57. Logan, supra note 3, at 45.
58. Id. at 27.
Two concerns about the way in which Victim Impact Evidence is
presented buttress these objections to its content.  First, the evidence is
functionally, if not legally, irrebuttable.51  Second, it has enormous emotional
power.52
The difficulty in rebutting Victim Impact Evidence was conceded by the
Payne majority, which stated that “the mere fact that for tactical reasons it
might not be prudent for the defense to rebut victim impact evidence makes
the case no different than others in which a party is faced with this sort of a
dilemma.”53  However, the difficulty in rebutting Victim Impact Evidence may
not be simply “tactical.”  Wayne A. Logan has found instances of legal
barriers, such as courts ruling that evidence is inadmissible when it shows that
the victim was involved in drugs or had solicited a prostitute.54
The emotional power of Victim Impact Evidence amplifies the concerns
associated with its permissibility.  Stories of murder victims are tragic
narratives.55  Beyond the inherent power of these narratives is the broad
variety of ways in which they have been presented during sentencing phases:
through “poems, videotapes, pre-death photographs, and handcrafted items
made by the victim.”56  It has been argued that Payne “has placed emotion
front and center in capital trials,”57 and it is difficult to overestimate the
emotional power of Victim Impact Evidence that can cause a trial judge to
weep “openly.”58
These substantive concerns about the power of Victim Impact Evidence
and the manner in which it is presented take on particular weight in light of
the momentous decision that is being made at a capital sentencing proceeding.
2.  Procedural Concerns
Two procedural concerns about Victim Impact Evidence are that juries
are not provided with sufficient guidance as to its use, and that it does not
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59. Commonwealth v. Means, 773 A.2d 143, 162 (Pa. 2001) (Nigro, J., dissenting); Blume, supra
note 1, at 275-76.
60. Means, 773 A.2d at 162 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
61. Blume, supra note 1, at 275-76.
62. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (West 1998).
63. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(2) (West 1998).
64. Means, 773 A.2d at 162 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
65. Commonwealth v. Rice, 795 A.2d 340, 363-64 (Pa. 2002) (Nigro, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
66. Means, 773 A.2d at 165 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
level the playing field between prosecution and defense—even assuming that
a level playing field is desirable or constitutional.  There is a dearth of
procedural guidance for the introduction and consideration of Victim Impact
Evidence.59  The fact that juries frequently are not told how to evaluate Victim
Impact Evidence is the source of much criticism, both within Pennsylvania60
and around the country.61  In Pennsylvania, juries are statutorily required to
receive clear instructions that the sentence must be death if aggravating
circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances.62  However, with regard to
Victim Impact Evidence, they are told only that if there is at least one
aggravating and one mitigating circumstance, they “shall consider, in
weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, any evidence
presented about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim’s
family.”63  These instructions beg the questions of what exactly Victim Impact
Evidence is (an aggravating circumstance or something else?) and precisely
how it is to be “considered.”64
Justice Nigro of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepts the
constitutionality of Victim Impact Evidence itself, but concludes that
“Pennsylvania’s statutory provisions governing victim impact evidence in the
penalty phase of capital cases violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”65  Justice Nigro has
laid out a proposed “set of procedural safeguards,” including allowing
testimony by only one adult relative of the victim and allowing Victim Impact
Evidence only if the defendant introduces evidence under the “catchall”
mitigator.66
A second procedural concern is that Victim Impact Evidence tampers
with the constitutional balance between the powers of the state and the rights
of the accused.  As Justice Stevens stated in his Payne dissent, “The premise
that a criminal prosecution requires an evenhanded balance between the State
and the defendant is . . . incorrect.  The Constitution grants certain rights to
the criminal defendant and imposes special limitations on the State designed
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67. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 860 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 822.
69. Mandery, supra note 44, at 507-08.
70. Id. at 507.
71. Id. at 508.
72. Id. at 507.
73. Id. at 508.
74. Id. at 507-08.
to protect the individual from overreaching by the disproportionately powerful
State.”67  This argument calls into question one of the main rationales of the
Payne majority’s ruling:  the desire to redress the “unfairly weighted” scales
in a capital trial by relaxing the limits on evidence the State may present.68
Evan J. Mandery argues that even if an imbalance exists in capital
sentencing, Victim Impact Evidence does not correct it.69  Mandery points out
that the broad admissibility of mitigating factors increases the likelihood that
“a defendant will be unjustly spared.”70  Victim Impact Evidence, on the other
hand, increases the chances that a defendant will be unjustly sentenced to
death.71  “[E]ven if admitting unlimited mitigating evidence is wrong, the
admission of victim impact evidence is not a wrong that counteracts the other
wrong.  It is just another wrong.”72  Mandery argues that if mitigating
evidence about the defendant’s life creates a real imbalance, the proper
solution would be to allow aggravating evidence about the defendant’s life.73
Victim Impact Evidence does not redress imbalance in a symmetrical fashion.
Instead, it introduces another arbitrary factor into sentencing-phase
considerations, thus increasing the likelihood that the outcome will be
unjust.74
These two arguments about balance—that of Justice Stevens and that of
Mandery—together create a cogent argument against Victim Impact Evidence.
In sum, the argument is that any imbalance in favor of the accused was created
intentionally by the U.S. Constitution, and even if we wish to ameliorate the
imbalance now, Victim Impact Evidence fails to do the job.
B.  Criticism of Execution Impact Evidence
To say that Victim Impact Evidence has been subjected to a fair amount
of criticism is not to say that Execution Impact Evidence is not also
problematic.  One argument against Execution Impact Evidence follows from
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75. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
76. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 817 A.2d 1033, 1054 (Pa. 2002).
77. Logan, supra note 3, at 4.
78. Id. at 5.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55 (summarizing the difficulties in rebutting Victim
Impact Evidence).
80. Mandery, supra note 44, at 507.
81. Id. at 508.
82. Commonwealth v. Harris, 817 A.2d 1033, 1054 (Pa. 2002).
83. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
the discussion of symmetry above;75 another attacks the relevance of the
evidence.76
1.  Lack of Symmetry
Advocates of Execution Impact Evidence argue that it is Victim Impact
Evidence, not the defendant’s freedom to present mitigating circumstances,
that has led to an imbalance in capital sentencing.77  They contend that the
imbalance favors the state rather than the defendant, and that Execution
Impact Evidence is the necessary remedy.78  However, Mandery’s reasoning
seems to lead to the conclusion that Execution Impact Evidence only adds
another arbitrary factor to the sentencing phase because it fails to directly
address Victim Impact Evidence.  A direct solution to the problem of Victim
Impact Evidence would be to increase the legal and tactical feasibility of
rebutting it.79
From this viewpoint, Execution Impact Evidence represents another
counterproductive maneuver in pursuit of the elusive goal of balance between
the accused and the State.  Unlimited mitigating evidence represents an
arbitrary factor in sentencing proceedings;80 Victim Impact Evidence adds a
second arbitrary factor;81 and Execution Impact Evidence would toss in yet a
third.  With each step in a potentially endless loop of imbalance and redress,
the total odds of an arbitrary or unjust outcome increase.
2.  Lack of Relevance
In ruling that Execution Impact Evidence is not admissible in
Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that Execution
Impact Evidence is irrelevant.82  This conclusion relies on a relatively narrow
interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Skipper v. South
Carolina.83
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84. Id. at 4.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 4-5 (citation omitted).
87. Id. at 7.
88. 817 A.2d 1033, 1053 (Pa. 2002).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1054.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citation omitted).
93. Id.
94. Id.
In Skipper, the defendant sought to introduce evidence “regarding his
good behavior during the over seven months he spent in jail awaiting trial.”84
The Court noted that its precedents required that a defendant not be precluded
from introducing, “as a mitigating factor, any aspect of [his] character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that [he] proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death.”85  Concluding that the evidence was
admissible, the Court stated, “Although it is true that any such inferences
would not relate specifically to [the defendant’s] culpability for the crime he
committed, there is no question but that such inferences would be ‘mitigating’
in the sense that they might serve ‘as a basis for a sentence less than death.’”86
The Court went on to explain that evidence of the defendant’s good
adjustment to prison was “an aspect of his character that is by its nature
relevant to the sentencing determination.”87
In Commonwealth v. Harris, the defendant sought to introduce testimony
by his family about how his crime had affected them.88  He argued that
Skipper mandated the admissibility of this testimony as “relevant mitigation
evidence.”89  The majority rejected the defendant’s argument.90  The opinion
distinguished the Harris Execution Impact Evidence from the Skipper
character evidence by stating that Execution Impact Evidence has “no bearing
on [the defendant’s] character or record or the circumstances of the offense.”91
Having concluded that federal law did not require the admissibility of the
Execution Impact Evidence, the Harris court stated that admissibility was not
required by Pennsylvania’s capital sentencing statute because it “does not fall
within any of the seven specific mitigating circumstances [or] the ‘catchall’
mitigating circumstance.”92  The “catchall” mitigator, the court explained,
“obviously mirrors the requirements of Skipper”93 that evidence be relevant
to “the defendant’s character or record or the circumstances of the crime.”94
Therefore, Pennsylvania’s capital sentencing law has no place for Execution
Impact Evidence.
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95. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986).
96. See discussion supra Part III.B.
97. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4.
98. King & Norgard, supra note 45, at 1148.
99. 879 P.2d 162 (Or. 1994).
100. Id. at 164.
101. Id. at 168.
Execution Impact Evidence, like Victim Impact Evidence, is susceptible
to attack because it focuses on the impact of the defendant’s life on his or her
loved ones, rather than the defendant’s character or record or the
circumstances of the offense.95
IV.  THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXECUTION IMPACT EVIDENCE AS CHARACTER
EVIDENCE
Despite the arguments against Execution Impact Evidence,96 this Note
argues that it is character evidence and, therefore, admissible under the U.S.
Constitution according to the Supreme Court’s Skipper decision.  Execution
Impact Evidence shows the defendant’s character through his or her familial
relationships.  Furthermore, when it is excluded, there is a risk that the
resulting gap in information will damage the rest of the defense narrative
about the defendant’s character or record and the circumstances of the
offense.97
A.  Execution Impact Evidence as Character Evidence
Execution Impact Evidence is a form of character evidence, the
admissibility of which is required by U.S. Supreme Court precedents such as
Skipper.98  The Oregon Supreme Court followed this line of reasoning in State
v. Stevens.99  In that case, the defendant’s wife had testified about the effect
of the defendant’s potential execution on their young daughter.100  The court
reasoned that although this testimony
may not offer any direct evidence about [the] defendant’s character or background, it
does offer circumstantial evidence.  A rational juror could infer from the witness’s
testimony that she believed that her daughter would be affected adversely by [the]
defendant’s execution because of something positive about his relationship with his
daughter and because of something positive about [the] defendant’s character or
background.101
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102. People v. Ochoa, 966 P.2d 442, 505-06 (Cal. 1998).
103. Commonwealth v. Harris, 817 A.2d 1033, 1053-54 (Pa. 2002).
104. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 110 (1982)).
105. Logan, supra note 3, at 9 (citing Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276 (1998)).
106. King & Norgard, supra note 45, at 1144 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05
(1978)).
107. Logan, supra note 3, at 37-38.
108. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4 (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110).
109. Logan, supra note 3, at 47.
The California Supreme Court articulated its approval of Execution
Impact Evidence through similar language, stating that it “constitutes indirect
evidence of the defendant’s character.”102
In holding that Execution Impact Evidence is irrelevant,103 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court took a narrow view of what kind of evidence is
relevant to the defendant’s character or record or the circumstances of the
offense.  However, a narrow reading is not warranted by U.S. Supreme Court
decisions.104  The Supreme Court “has repeatedly insisted that states permit
unconstrained consideration of ‘all relevant mitigating evidence.’”105  A broad
reading fits with the widely accepted idea that capital sentencing is sui
generis—a category unto itself.106  Because of the extreme significance of the
jury’s sentencing decision, the law surrounding the death penalty has
consistently sought to take into account the individuality of each defendant.107
The importance of individualization weighs on the side of admission of
evidence about the defendant’s character as reflected in his familial
relationships.
According to the logic endorsed by courts such as the Oregon and
California Supreme Courts, the admissibility of Execution Impact Evidence
is required by the Supreme Court’s holding that “the sentencer . . . not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant’s character or record.”108
B.  Execution Impact Evidence as Part of a Narrative Whole
Wayne A. Logan points out that in a capital trial, it is extremely important
for the defense attorney to create a “narrative whole.”109  The U.S. Supreme
Court acknowledged the importance of trial narrative in Old Chief v. United
States:
2005] ADMISSIBILITY OF EXECUTION IMPACT EVIDENCE 443
110. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187-88 (1997).
111. Id. at 188.
112. See WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES 76-87 (1991).
113. Id. at 86 (quoting Craig Haney regarding the death sentence of David Carpenter).
114. Id. at 79.
115. See id. at 105-06.
116. See id. at 80-85 (describing the penalty trial and death sentence of defendant David Carpenter).
117. Logan, supra note 3, at 47.
118. Id. at 49 (quoting Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence:  Tests of the Story
Model for Juror Decision Making, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 190 (1992)).
119. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986).
When a juror’s duty does seem hard, the evidentiary account of what a defendant has
thought and done can accomplish what no set of abstract statements ever could, not just
to prove a fact but to establish its human significance, and so to implicate the law’s moral
underpinnings and a juror’s obligation to sit in judgment.110
Old Chief referred specifically to the prosecution’s prerogative to create
a narrative for the jury.111  However, the importance of the capital defense
attorney’s creation of a coherent story at the penalty trial has been well
documented.112  Defendants who are at risk of being sentenced to death have
often committed the most shocking types of murders, and as one capital
defense attorney has said, “[P]eople who commit extraordinary crimes have
extraordinary backgrounds and are responding to extraordinary
circumstances.”113  It is extremely important for the defense attorney to enjoy
the same prerogative as the prosecution:  the ability to tell a story that will
allow the jury to feel empathy for the defendant’s circumstances,114 which are
often unimaginably dreadful.115  Presenting evidence about the defendant’s
history at the proper time, and in the proper manner, can have life and death
consequences.116
The ability to tell a complete story about the defendant’s character and
relationships takes on special importance because of the admissibility of
Victim Impact Evidence.117  Without Execution Impact Evidence, the jury only
hears the story of one family’s grief and pain.  The other family is silenced on
this matter, and the narrative gap could lead a jury to draw negative inferences
about the defendant’s character.118  Thus, the exclusion of Execution Impact
Evidence may undermine other evidence about the defendant’s character and
record—evidence that is inarguably admissible under the U.S. Constitution.119
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120. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
121. See King & Norgard, supra note 45, at 1124.
122. Id.
123. See discussion supra Part II.A.
124. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
125. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 817 A.2d 1033, 1060 (Pa. 2002) (Zappala, C.J., concurring and
dissenting); King & Norgard, supra note 45, at 1125.  See generally Logan, supra note 3.
126. Logan, supra note 3, at 14.
127. King & Norgard, supra note 45, at 1126.
128. Harris, 817 A.2d at 1060 (Zappala, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
V.  CONCLUSION
Execution Impact Evidence has come to the fore because the U.S.
Supreme Court created a new category of admissible evidence, Victim Impact
Evidence, through its decision in Payne v. Tennessee.120  The real problem
may be the admissibility of Victim Impact Evidence in Pennsylvania, not the
inadmissibility of Execution Impact Evidence.121  However, there seems to be
little reason to hope for an end to Victim Impact Evidence in the near future,122
especially since the Pennsylvania General Assembly specifically inserted
authorization for Victim Impact Evidence into the state’s capital sentencing
statute.123  Therefore, capital jurisprudence in Pennsylvania must strive toward
fairness in a system that includes Victim Impact Evidence.
It could be argued that allowing Execution Impact Evidence only
introduces another arbitrary factor into a sentencing procedure that already
contains too many opportunities for unjust outcomes.124  Nevertheless, court
opinions and commentators have cogently advanced the idea that Execution
Impact Evidence should be admitted to redress the bias toward the prosecution
represented by Victim Impact Evidence.125
The emotional power of Victim Impact Evidence, combined with the lack
of substantive and procedural limitations on its presentation, have led to the
argument that it “creates a seriously imbalanced capital jurisprudence.”126
Execution Impact Evidence addresses the imbalance by allowing jurors to
consider the impact of the loss of a loved one on the defendant’s family as
well as the victim’s.127  Then-Chief Justice Zappala stated the point succinctly
in a dissenting opinion:  “[B]ecause our Court has opened the door to allow
the jury to hear evidence regarding the impact of the victim’s death, the door
should not now close when the defendant attempts to offer evidence as to the
impact the execution will have on his benefactors.”128
